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I. INTRODUCTION
Business records and confidential information are obtained by
government agencies through discovery in federal courts. What
occurs with these documents from the point when the trial is over
and the discovery is in the agency's possession is subject, in part, to
the court's discretion assuming no court restrictions are applied.
When the use of the discovery materials is not protected by the court
or restricted by the parties, the materials are available to the public
via a Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) request or through a
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The statute was originally enacted as the Freedom of
Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) and was codified by Pub. L. No.
90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) at 5 U.S.C. § 552. The FOIA was amended in the 1974
Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974),
and again in the Government in the Sunshine Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241,
1247 (1976). For information relating to the background of the Act see generally Davis,
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
statutory right of access to discovery materials. The particular types
of documents at issue and the unique roles played by the regulatory
agencies that acquire the information suggest access to the
information under either guise, and this Comment offers a plausible
basis to support the disclosure of this business information.2
After a brief prelude into the types of business information at
issue, sections III and IV focus on how the outcome of this issue
depends on the definition given to the term "records," whether
agency or court records, and presents two approaches supporting
disclosure of discovered business information. Section V presents
differing court-created solutions to the issue of whether business
information should be made available to the public when it becomes
involved with federal regulatory agencies in court. After evaluating
the courts' positions, section VI incorporates the courts' concerns and
suggests that a dual-nature of business documents is created whereby
they become public, subject only to few limitations.3
II. TYPES OF DOCUMENTS AT ISSUE
Although civil discovery materials are generally subject to
disclosure, federal regulatory agencies often obtain highly relevant
confidential business data that unquestionably needs protection from
the disclosure requirements. This business data principally falls into
three categories: commercial information,4 financial information,5
1247 (1976). For information relating to the background of the Act see generally Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Ci. L. REv. 761 (1967).
2 "The appropriateness of making court files accessible is accentuated in cases where
the government is a party; in such circumstances, the public's right to know what the
executive branch is about coalesces with the concomitant right of the citizenry to appraise
the judicial branch." Fed. Trade Coms'n v. Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st
Cir. 1987). The same court, however, took the view that demonstrated their unwillingness
to discuss the issue of availability of court records not otherwise publicly available. See Id.
at 408, n.3.
3 The limitations considered are protective orders and stipulated agreements.
4 Business data falls into the category of commercial information even if it deals
with another individual's commercial activity. Determining whether information is
commercial in nature hinges on the immediate use from which the agency obtained the




Applicable to these three types of information are some general
principles surrounding all confidential data. Such information requires
a subjective analysis as to whether the matters are customarily held
in confidence by the owner and others similarly situated, and an
objective analysis of whether disclosure would a) significantly harm
the owner's competitive position, and b) deter others from submitting
this detailed information to the agency in the future.7 The key to
this definition is that the information must be customarily
confidential, i.e., the industry as a whole generally seeks protection
for this type of data.'
The information examined thus far reveals the concerns
surrounding potential disclosure. These concerns include the
potential disclosure of research to competitors, potential economic
injury, and the disincentive for private industry to develop and
maintain valuable confidential information. Yet, the issue remains
DISCLOSURE, 14-32 (1st ed. 1983).
Although financial information overlaps at times with commercial information,
case law distinguishes it and finds that financial information is protectable in its own right.
Examples of this information include profit and loss data, Nati Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976), (loan application figures); Rural Housing Alliance
v. US Dept of Agric., 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974), (overhead and operating costs); Kleppe,
547 F.2d 673, (pricing data and other credit related information); Stone v. Export-Import
Bank, 552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1977).
6 Trade secrets are defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of info, used
in one's business that permits him to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it .... A trade secret is a device or process for the continuous use in the
operation of the business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1938). To qualify for a trade secret,
several important elements are taken into account. First, the extent of knowledge outside
the business regarding this information. Second, the extent of knowledge among co-workers
and employees. Third, the value of the information to a business and its competitors.
Fourth, the amount of effort and money spent on development. And fifth, the ease or
difficulty in duplication or other proper acquisition of the knowledge by the action of others.
O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 14-19.
7 O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 14-43.
8 Id. at 14-44, n.8.
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whether the public's interests in disclosure and free access override
these private concerns. Resolution of this issue often hinges on the
definition given to agency and court records.
IIl. ASCERTAINING THE DEFINITION OF AGENCY
AND COURT RECORDS
This Comment focuses on the two potential avenues available to
gain access to business records obtained through civil discovery: 1)
by means of an FOIA request, and 2) through a statutory right of
access. The first is dependent upon an investigation of how the
Freedom of Information Act and its legislative history define agency
and court records.9 The statutory right of access primarily relies on
the interpretation of "court records" and whether a record is also an
agency record is secondary for purposes of disseminating the
information.
A. Records Under The Freedom of Information Act:
A Definitional Approach
The FOIA requires disclosure of records, ° but does not define
what precisely constitutes a record. 1 Therefore, courts have the task
of declaring what does and what does not constitute a record for
purposes of the Act. The simplicity of this statement by no means
suggests that the courts chose a simplistic and uniform approach to
resolve the issue. A court-constructed definition is, however, a
vantage point from which discovered business materials may be
9 An important point to keep in mind when ascertaining the definition of agency
records in the FOI Act is best summed up in Stephen D. Hall, What is a Record? Two
Approaches to the Freedom of Information Act's Threshold Inquiry, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv.
408 (1978), which states "[t]he [FOI] Act did not set out to describe records--only to make
them available." Id. at 418.
10 FOIA requires government entities covered by the Act to release "agency records"
upon request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976).
1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 and 552 (1976), the applicable sections to FOIA, do not define
the term "record."
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examined to determine whether they ae to be included under the FOIA."
12 Another approach to defining "agency records" is to examine how the regulatory
agencies define the term in relation to court documents. Various regulatory agencies define
the term differently, and the results of these incongruent definitions are apparent. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the following position regarding papers
filed with the court:
Copies of papers filed in court, and papers and documents received from
courts, are primarily for the use of the Commission attorneys and other
members of the staff .... However, in appropriate situations, with the
approval of the Office of the General Counsel, examination of such material
may be made or copies obtained as a matter of courtesy.
Securities and Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 200.80a (1992). Thus, the SEC makes ad hoc
determinations as to whether purported court documents should be released pursuant to an
FOIA request.
A slightly different approach is taken by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The
FTC, for purposes of FOI requests, categorizes public records to include adjudicative
proceedings and litigated orders. FTC Act 16 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(5) (1992). This category is
further divided to include "documents received in evidence or made a part of the public
record," "[o]rders and opinions in locutory matters," 16 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(5)(iii) (1992), and
(v) Petitions, applications, pleadings, briefs, and other recordsfided by
the Commission with the courts in connection with adjudicative, injunctive,
enforcement, compliance, and condemnation proceedings, and in judicial
review of Commission actions, and opinions and orders of the courts in
disposition thereof; (emphasis added).
16 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(5)(v) (1992). Hence, the FTC considers materials filed through the
course of all its litigation to be subject to public disclosure.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) also defines public records.
Regulation § 145.0(c) defines "public records" to include "those records that have been
determined by the Commission to be generally available to the public... ", 17 C.F.R. 145.0
(1990). The CFTC limits this broad definition by defining "nonpublic records". 17 C.F.R.
§ 145.0(d) (1990). It is interesting to note that trade secrets and commercial or financial
information falls into this definition of "nonpublic records." See 17 C.F.R. 145.5(d).
Nonpublic records maintained in the CFTC are generally nondisclosable, but certain
nonpublic records are subject to disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. § 145.5. For purposes of the
issues in this Comment, however, CFTC litigation documents and documents contained in
reparations and enforcement cases are disclosable, unless subject to protective order. 17
C.F.R. § 145, Appendix A.
These agency definitions are integral to a realistic understanding of how federal
regulatory agencies tend to treat documents in their possession and that the agencies have
different agendas from the legislature and the courts. These definitions show the
tremendous leeway agencies possess to determine whether a document may be made
publicly available. Moreover, agencies generally tend to side with the FOIA legislative
intent, that being in favor of free access.
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Three seminal cases define the term "agency records" in the
context of FOIA: Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
Press,3 Forsham v. Harris,14 and Department of Justice v. Tax
Analysts. 5 These cases lay out two requirements that must be met
in order to qualify as "agency records":
First, an agency must 'either create or obtain' the
requested materials 'as a prerequisite to its becoming an
agency record within the meaning of FOA. ...
Second, the agency must be in control of the requested
materials at the time the FOIA request is made. By control
we [the Court] mean[s] that the materials have come into the
agency's possession in the legitimate conduct of its official
duties. 6
Tax Analysts held that the relevant inquiry is whether an agency
covered by the FOIA has created or obtained the materials sought,
not whether the organization from which the documents originated
is itself covered by the FOIA."7 Forsham held that agency records
include "all books, papers . . . regardless of physical form or
characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States
Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction
of public business."' 8
These definitions are critical to whether there is a basis to
disseminate business documents, albeit discovery documents, through
the FOLA. Although the Court does not expressly declare that
discovery materials are subject to the FOIA, this issue can be (as
opposed to must be) answered in the affirmative. Since the Court is
not clear in defining "records," a standard approach would require an
13 445 U.S. 136 (1980)(holding that audio tapes of assistant to the president are not
agency records; merely moving them to a FOIA-covered agency does not render them
"agency records").
14 445 U.S. 169 (1980)(recognizing that records of a nonagency could become
agency records as well).
15 492 U.S. 136 (1989).
16 Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 144-145 (citations omitted).
17 Id. at 146 (footnote' and citation omitted).
is 445 U.S. at 183.
BUSINESS RECORDS
investigation into the FOIA legislative intent. Such an investigation,
however, would prove fruitless.
B. Legislative History of Public Access Laws
Beyond the court imposed FOIA definitions discussed above, the
legislative history of FOIA sheds little light on the meaning of
"agency records." What little light is shed reveals that Congress
intended to create a more open basis for the public to obtain
information." The legislative history of the predecessor to the
FOIA,20 however, does discuss the term "public information." This
earlier legislation intended all public information to be disclosed,
except where withholding of federal agency records was required "in
the public interest", where the records relate "solely to the internal
management of an agency", or "for good cause found., 21 Congress
found these "exceptions" to be abused,22 and rephrased the
legislation to be more precise in defining the type of records to be
excluded from disclosure.
The significance of this legislation is that "[tirade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from any person" were
considered exempt from disclosure.23 In formulating a definition of
what does not constitute an agency record, Congress delineated these
materials to be exempt only if "such material . . . would not
customarily be made public .."24 or if the information was given to
an agency in confidence, i.e., with a protective order in effect.
The varied definitions and interpretations of "records" creates
disparity in accurately determining what is included and what is
excluded under FOIA. The courts offer a somewhat workable ad hoc
19 See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6285 (1973). The
Report discusses amendments to the Freedom of Information Act that disapproved certain
court interpretations which limited agency distribution of investigatory records.
Furthermore, the Conference Report discusses the expansion of the term "agency" to include
more government controlled offices under FOIA, which is in line with the congressional
intent underlying the creation of the Act in the first place.
20 5 U.S.C. § 1002, also known as Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
21 See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2418, 2420 (1966).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 2427.
24 Id
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approach, but the uncertainty in the Act itself leaves everyone,
including the courts, with few precise interpretations. The strongest
suggestions offered by Congress in its passage of two public
information bills indicate a broad interpretation of the term "records."
This broad interpretation can reasonably include business documents
obtained through discovery.
IV. THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF ACCESS
The problem raised with respect to distributing business
information obtained through discovery via an FOIA request stems
from the definition given to "agency records," but this problem may
be overcome by circumventing the issue and focusing on properly
defining a "court record." Since court records are generally open to
the public/i agencies may distribute confidential material classified
as court records to whomever seeks it. The reasoning behind this is
that once the information is made public through the court, there is
no need to protect it.26
A. The History of the Doctrine
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its Advisory Committee
notes, 2' and the cases interpreting the Rules form and codify a
25 See Fed. Trade Comn's v. Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 410.
26 "A party may generally do what it wants with material obtained through the
discovery process, as long as it wants to do something legal." Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
768 F.2d 669, 683-684 (5th Cir. 1985). In Harris, the EEOC, an intervenor, was limited
to using the fruits of discovery to the present litigation because a showing of good cause
was made. In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern
Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that "an attorney is free to disperse
discovery materials when it is relevant to another action"Id.). "The Federal Rules [of Civil
Procedure] do not themselves limit the use of discovered documents or information."
Harris, 768 F.2d at 684.
V Reliance on the advisory committee notes is not unusual. Even the Supreme Court
has acknowledged their value. See Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444
(1946) (holding "although the Advisory Committee's comments do not foreclose judicial
consideration of the Rule's meaning, the construction given by the Committee in the Notes
is of weight" Id.) See also, Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21,31 (1986); Hawley v. Hall,
131 F.R.D. 578 (D.Nev. 1990); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
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statutory right of access to discovery documents. Rule 5(d) states,
Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served
upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service
or within a reasonable time thereafter, but the court may on
motion of a party or on its own initiative order that
depositions . . . interrogatories, requests for documents,
requests for admissions, and answers and responses thereto
not be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the
proceeding.2
The 1980 Advisory Committee Note to this section clarifies the
Rule's intent concerning the filing of discovery documents:
[b]y the terms of this rule and Rule 30(f) discovery materials
must be promptly.filed, although it often happens that no use
is made of the materials after they are filed. Because the
copies required for filing are an added expense and the large
volume . . . present[s] serious storage problems . . . the
Committee in 1978 first proposed that discovery materials not
be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the
proceedings. But such materials are sometimes of interest to
those of who may have no access to them except by a
requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants
similarly situated, or the public generally. Accordingly, this
amendment and a change in Rule 30(f)(1) continue the filing
requirement but make it subject to an order of the court that
discovery materials not be filed unless filing is requested by
the court or is effected by parties who wish to use the
materials in the proceeding.29
The 1980 draft amendment to Rule 5 required the filing of discovery
Civil 2d § 1029 at 124 (1987)(noting that "In interpreting the rules, the advisory committee
notes are a very important source of information and should be given considerable weight"
Id.).
22 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 5(d).
29 This Advisory Committee Note is reprinted at 85 F.R.D. 521, 525 (1980)
(emphasis added).
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materials, and effectively eliminated a previously drafted amendment
which rejected the filing requirement.3a
B. Case Law Interpretation of the Statutory Right of Access
The Second Circuit addressed the Advisory Committee concerns
in In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation.3 t In allowing
non-party intervenors access to sealed discovery materials, the
Second Circuit announced,
[t]he [1978] Advisory Committee Notes make clear that Rule
5(d)... embodies the Committee's concern that class action
litigants and the general public be afforded access to
discovery materials whenever possible. Moreover, we note
that access is particularly appropriate when the subject matter
of the litigation is of especial public interest. 32
The court then recognized that Rules 5(d) and 26(c) provide a
statutory right of access to the discovery materials in question."
Thus, since the 1980 Advisory notes to Rule 5(d) explicitly require
filing of discovery documents, the documents should be considered
part of the court record.
The Southern District of New York also addressed the right of
access issue in SEC v. Amster & Co., et al.' In Amster, the
defendants asked the court for a protective order to prohibit the SEC
30 In Appendix A to the 1980 Committee Notes, 85 F.R.D. 521, 540, a letter from
Walter Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules addressed to the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure summarizes the criticism brought about by
the 1978 draft amendment to Rule 5. The letter emphasizes that the amendment places an
"unconscionable burden" on individuals in multi-party litigation to obtain court orders to
secure access to depositions that they could not attend; various organizations complained
about the limitation of public access; and the fear was expressed that the lack of records
would impede research about discovery, that papers would be lost or destroyed, and that
discovery materials' integrity would be impaired. The Chairman of the Committee in the
advisory notes goes on to state that a judge would not be expected to excuse parties from
filing materials in any case in which the public or the press has an interest.
31 821 F.2d 139, 145-147 (2d Cir.).
32 Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
33 The documents in question in Agent Orange were materials produced or generated
during discovery that were under seal and labelled "confidential."
34 126 F.R.D. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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from disclosing the contents of any deposition or any document
produced during discovery and during an earlier SEC investigation
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum." The court refused to grant
the protective order because defendants knew that certain information
would be disclosed.36 Given the notice, defendants could not
reasonably believe that the SEC had agreed "forever and a day" to
withhold from members of the public the testimony elicited and
documents produced during the ensuing investigation.37 In denying
the protective order, the court stated:
the thrust of recent Second Circuit authority militates against
this protective order ... [and] Rule 26(c) and Rule 5(d) give
civil litigants a statutory right of access to ...discovery
material, so that if 'good cause' is not shown, the discovery
materials .. . should not receive judicial protection and
therefore would be opened to the public for inspection.3"
Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.39 raises a similar argument.
Public Citizen, an intervenor, sought discovery documents from
parties in a suit brought by a smoker against tobacco companies.
The documents in question were company records. Public Citizen
based its claim solely on the statutory language of Rule 5(d) and
Rule 26(c), which create a presumption that all discovery materials
will be available to the public since they will be filed with the
court.'a The district court agreed and ordered the parties to file all
discovery documents in their possession. Upon affirming, the circuit
court stated that Public Citizen had the right to access the discovery
documents because there was no "good cause" shown by Liggett to
warrant confidentiality. In its opinion the court stated, "' [dliscovery
is a legislative grace,' but Public Citizen asks for no more than
compliance with the legislative scheme embodied in the federal rules
[Rule 5(d)]. 41
35 Id. at 30.
3 Id.
3 Id. at31.
38 Id. (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d at 144).
39 Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 779 (1st Cir. 1988).
40 Id. at 780.
41 Id. at 788 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)).
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C. The Trend in Filing Discovery Documents
It is essential to bear in mind that district courts do not want
discovery documents physically filed with them because of their lack
of storage space and the unnecessary costs associated with the filing
requirement. What is important is that courts, and the Federal Rules,
are not changing the substantive classification of discovery
documents from court records to non-court records by changing the
filing procedures.42
Most district courts do not require the filing of discovery
materials with the court.43 The exceptions and limits to this "rule," in
light of Rule 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, support
a finding that discovery materials are still part of the court record
and hence available to the public. For example, local rule 33-36(f)
of the District of Massachusetts provides, in part, that any party or
"concerned citizen" may make an ex parte request that discovery
documents be filed." The District of Hawaii's local rule 230(2)(b)
and District of Montana's Rule 200(3) are in accord with
Massachusetts' Rule 33-36(f). 4  These rules do not address whether
every "concerned citizen" must make an ex parte request for the
materials. However, logic suggests that once the materials are part
of the record, the public is free to inspect them. Hence, public
availability of discovery materials is not limited by these local rules.
42 See Note, Nonparty Access To Discovery Materials In The Federal Courts, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1085 (1981):
If the record-storage problem is of sufficient magnitude to warrant rules amendments,
amended rule 5(d) is nevertheless misguided. Rule 5(d) creates storage at the expense
of the most vital documents-those pertaining to current litigation. It would have been
preferable to dispose of old, inactive files.
Assuming that 5(d) will be the operative storage remedy for the foreseeable future,
judges should be extremely reluctant to excuse parties from filing with the court, and
should never waive filing requirements in cases of complex litigation for their potential
efficient collateral use [, and] papers from government litigation for their utility in
public supervision of the workings of the government. (emphasis added). Id.
43 See Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 582, n.6 (D. Nev. 1990) (recognizing that
sixty-four districts have adopted rules which provide that discovery materials need not be
filed).
4 D. MASS. R. Civ. P. 33-36(0.
45 D. HAw. R. Civ. P. 230(2)(b).
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The District of Columbia also requires the filing of discovery
materials. Its local rule 107 provides, in part,
(a) . . . . Except as otherwise provided by this rule upon
request of any person or on its own motion, the court may in
its discretion order that all or any portion of discovery
materials in a particular civil case shall not be filed with the
Clerk.
In the Advisory Committee's Comment To Rule 107, the district
discusses its new rule:
[Tihe filing of discovery material is often expensive and
unnecessary. Where utilized, [the rule] will reduce the cost
of litigation and workload in the clerk's office. [However],
the Committee recognizes that many judges desire to see the
routine filing of discovery materials, and that in cases of
public interest, the press or other non-parties may wish access
to such materials. Accordingly, the rule provides that such
filing will continue in the absence of an order in each case by
the individual judge to whom the case is assigned."
This Advisory Comment is dispositive of the general attitude toward
discovery material.47
Case law also favorably interprets local rules. In Hawley v.
Hall,48 the court needed to harmonize the District Court of Nevada's
local rule 190-1(g) with the intent of the Advisory Committee (to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) regarding public access to
discovery materials. The court adopted a lenient policy that requires
the filing of discovery documents with the clerk of the court on the
4 D. D.C. R. CIV. P. 107, comment.
47 Other districts, such as the Eastern District of Missouri, require that depositions
be filed with the court the day of the trial. The Rhode Island district makes it expressly
clear in local rule 14(b) that depositions filed shall be open and available for inspection
unless otherwise ordered by the court. New Jersey's district court abides by local rule 15(d)
which states that when discovery is filed, the clerk shall place it in the open file. These
rules demonstrate the district courts' desire to limit the storage space required for discovery,
not limit its usefulness and availability to the public.
48 131 F.R.D. at 583.
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request of a nonparty if disclosure is not prohibited by a protective
order.49 This policy eliminated any tension between the local rule
and Rule 5(d) by allowing the underlying principle of Rule 5 to
prevail.5
V. HOW COURTS ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ACCESS
TO DISCOVERED BUSINESS DATA
Court decisions related to the dissemination of discovered
business materials are divided as to whether such access should exist,
to what limit access is to be permitted, and by what avenue such
disclosure should be granted. Four cases offer contrasting opinions
and interpretations of this issue, and each case will be discussed in
light of its facts, ruling, and pertinent dicta.
A. Cases Permitting Disclosure
1. Cooper v. Commissioner5'
In Cooper, a district court decided whether the return of
confidential financial documents to the IRS from the court restores
the documents' "confidential" nature. The action arose pursuant to
an FOIA request for various documents introduced by the Internal
Revenue Service as exhibits in cases before the United States Tax
Court.5 2  After the tax cases ended, the court returned the
confidential information to the IRS.53 Cooper, a law school
professor, sought access to the materials under the theory that since
the documents were already part of the public proceedings, their
confidentiality had been removed.
The court resolved the issue by considering: 1) how the law
treats other confidential documents made public, and 2) the policies
49 The court reasoned "[iln the absence of a protective order, discovery materials,
including deposition transcripts, shall be filed with the clerk on order of the court and shall
then be available for public examination and copying." Id. at 583.
50 Id.
51 450 F. Supp. 752 (D. D.C. 1977).
52 Id
53 Id. at 753.
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embodied in FOIA.5' In holding that the documents lost their
confidential nature due to their exposure in the court proceedings, the
court made clear that the actual location of the documents is not
determinative of who actually controls them." The court also noted
"[t]he primary objective of the FOIA is to facilitate the broadest
possible disclosure of information held by the government."'56
2. FTC v. Standard Financial Management Corp.
57
In a second case granting access to court documents, the First
Circuit permitted sworn personal financial statements to be unsealed
and made available to the public. The appellants, two owners of a
closely held corporation, attempted to persuade the court that the
financial documents in question played no role in the adjudicatory
process and therefore lay beyond the reach of the public.'
Appellants bad their claim to privacy on a provision in the FTC
Act,59 and that release of the documents will intrude "impermissibly
upon their privacy. '' 0
The court rejected both claims holding that public access attached
to the documents. The statutory claim failed upon a facial reading
of the FTC Act as opposed to the guessing game of legislative intent
suggested by appellants.61  The privacy claim fell as well.
Significantly, the court recognized "that privacy rights of participants
and third parties are among those interests which can limit the
presumptive right of access to judicial records. '"62  The interests
sought to be protected, however, did not fall within the purview of
this limit.
5 it at 754.
55 Id. at 755.
56 Id.
5 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987).
8 Id. at 408.
59 Id. at 411. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2 (1987) provides in pertinent part that while in the
possession of the FIC, no "documentary material" secured in the course of an official
investigation "shall be available for examination by any individual other than a duly
authorized officer or employee of the Commission without the consent of the person who
produced the material." 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2.
60 830 F.2d at 411.
61 Id.
2 Id (citations omitted).
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Although Standard Financial involved a criminal proceeding, and
the origin of the documents is distinguishable,63 the court's general
analysis of the financial statements in light of the competing interests
at stake provides support for this Comment's position. One critical
factor repeatedly referred to throughout Standard Financial is the
public's "right to know the contents of the materials upon which the
agency, and ultimately the court, relied in this endeavor."" This
factor, as expressed in the court's reasoning, requires the public to
monitor the functioning of the courts and the regulatory agencies,
"thereby insuring quality, honesty, and respect for our legal
system."65  These principles are not easily overcome thus an
individual's privacy concerns usually fall to the public's interest.
The nature of these concerns dictate that the court's analysis be
applied to discovery documents in the possession of federal
regulatory agencies.
B. Cases Denying Access
1. In re Consumers Power Co. Securities Litigation'
In re Consumers involved a newspaper company that sought
access to discovery materials by moving under Fed. R. of Civ. Proc.
24(b)67 to challenge the legality of a protective order. The
underlying action involved a securities fraud class action alleging
material misrepresentations in the sale of securities of the nuclear
plant built by Consumers Power. Booth Newspapers, Inc. merely
requested that the protective order be lifted so that the newspaper
could then bargain with the parties for access to the discovery
63 The financial statements were obtained pursuant to an investigation undertaken by
the FTC. The documents, however, were used during the adjudicatory proceeding.
66 830 F.2d at 413 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 410.
6 109 F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
67 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) states in part,
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when an applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Id.
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materials. Booth based its claim on a common law right of access
to civil pretrial discovery.68 The defendant, Consumers Power,
challenged the common law right of access arguing that parties had
standing only in limited circumstances.69
The court held that although Booth had standing, the protective
order was grounded in the requisite good cause shown because it
"serves an important government purpose of fostering immediate,
unrestricted access . . . and encourages cooperation among the
parties ... ,"70
The court's decision was based on the policy underlying the
discovery rules, and the standard applied by the district court. First,
the court recognized that the discovery rules contain safeguards
designed to protect against inefficient resistance to open access, and
to foster party cooperation.7 Secondly, the court's decision must be
considered with an eye towards the limited review standard available
to the court upon a challenged protective order. This standard does
not mandate the strict scrutiny applicable to restrictions on
traditionally public sources of information.72 Hence, the court
determined that pretrial discovery is not a "traditionally public source
of information" because "[m]uch of the information that surfaces
during pretrial discovery may be unrelated or only tangentially
related to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed
68 109 F.R.D. at 52. The court rejects the common law right of access argument but
considers a first amendment protection analysis based on the freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. Id. at 53. The court's negative
conclusions based on these theories may be overcome by an analysis of the statutory right
of access discussed in section V, infra. In fact, the court in In re Consumers advanced the
notion of liberal access with respect to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Id. at 50.
69 Consumers Power cited In re Knoxville News-Sentinel, 723 F.2d 470 (6th Cir
1983) for the proposition that standing applies only to: 1) persons present in open court
when their exclusion from the courtroom is being considered; and 2) to the public and press
"before being denied their presumptive right of access to judicial records." Consumers
Power then argued that the pretrial materials in question are not yet "judicial records",
therefore, no standing may exist. The court rejected this argument based on its discussion
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) which does not require discovery materials to be filed in order to
make them "judicial records." 109 F.R.D. at 50.
70 109 F.R.D. at 55.
71 Id. at 54.
72 Id. at 51. The Supreme Court also rejected an exacting strict scrutiny test in
determining the legitimacy of restrictions imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. See Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984).
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on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction
on a traditionally public source of information.,
73
The court also, recognized a continuum of court positions with
respect to pretrial documents not yet on file with the court.74 These
are 1) a court may prohibit disclosure by means of a protective order;
2) a court may remain neutral and permit parties to acquiesce to
requests; or 3) a court may order access of the materials. In re
Consumers involved only a review of the first position.75 Thus, the
court's position is consistent with this Comment's theory because the
existence of a protective order is a recognized limit on the
dissemination of discovery materials.
2. United States v. Kentucky Utilities
76
The United States brought an anti-trust action against Kentucky
Utilities Co. which resulted in five years of litigation and
discovery. 77 Upon a mutual agreement, the Department of Justice
dismissed the suit and entered into a proviso whereby the DOJ were
to destroy all discovery documents. 78 The proviso also stated that
the Department of Justice was not prevented from giving out the
information through an FOIA request.79 Pursuant to this proviso, a
newspaper writer, Kit Wagar, filed an FOIA request to obtain certain
discovery materials.
After several proceedings in the district and circuit courts, 0 the
73 109 F.R.D. at 51, citing Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 32-33.
74 109 F.R.D. at 50.
7 Id. at 51.
76 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991).
" Id. at 253.
78 Id. The proviso stated, in pertinent part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED .. . Plaintiff [DOJ] shall [destroy] all copies of
documents obtained through discovery procedures .. . except that: . . . (2) no
document subject to an outstanding [FOIA] request .. shall be required to be
destroyed until the request and any related litigation over the request . . . is
resolved. Id.
79 Id.
so On July 25, 1986, the district court denied Wagar's motion to intervene, stayed
the proviso, and prohibited any further destruction or disclosure of the discovery documents
until a separate FOIA action could be resolved. On December 18, 1986, Wagar filed a
FOIA action against the DOJ seeking release of improperly withheld agency records in the
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district court granted Wagar intervenor status and ordered the DOJ
to stop destroying the discovery documents. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit reversed: "[T]he question posed by Wagar's request for
intervention is not all that different from the one she ultimately hopes
to have answered under the FOIA -- whether she is entitled to the
copies as agency records."8 ' The court noted that absent discovery,
the documents would remain private and were not part of the court
record. Therefore, although intervenor status was granted, the
parties' strong reliance upon their settlement agreement was not
overcome because Wagar failed to establish the "kind of
extraordinary circumstances and compelling need . . . which
outweighs the original parties' interests in preserving the terms of the
[original order] and the public's interest in fostering and preserving
settlements." 2
C. Comparison of the Cases
In each of these cases, though factually different, the courts were
challenged to clearly define the term "record." The results often
depended upon public policy and the general concern for encouraging
communication between parties. The cases do not directly address
1) confidentiality concerns, or 2) whether confidential information
obtained through discovery is subject to FOIA requirements, 3 the
statutory right of access or any other right of access. All four cases,
however, support public access to confidential materials.
Cooper and Standard Financial clearly support the proposition
that discovery materials may be obtained by the public. Standard
Financial rejected outright the argument that "documents which play
district court. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the agency was
merely complying with the court order. See Wagar v. Dep't of Justice, 846 F.2d 1040 (6th
Cir. 1988). Wagar then moved to intervene in the underlying antitrust action. The district
court granted her motion and rescinded the provision requiring the DOJ to destroy the
discovery documents. 927 F.2d at 254.
81 927 F.2d at 255.
92 Id.
83 Kentucky Utilities, 927 F.2d at 254, recognized "whether these kinds of documents
are subject to the requirements of the FOIA is a question which has dogged these
proceedings from the beginning, but has yet to be decided." Circuit Judge Ralph B. Guy,
Jr. took it upon himself to answer this inquiry in the negative. 927 F.2d at 255-256
(concurring opinion).
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no role in the adjudicatory process, however, such as those used only
in discovery, lie beyond reach."' The First Circuit held this as too
restrictive a view of what constitutes a court record for the purpose
of allowing public access, and delineated the following rule:
Relevant documents submitted to and accepted by a court in the
course of adjudicatory proceedings become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies.85
In addition, Kentucky Utilities and In re Consumers do not
unconditionally oppose the dissemination of discovery materials. In
Kentucky Utilities the court was clearly uncertain whether the
discovery material was an agency record for purposes of FOIA.a6
Therefore, the court acknowledged the possibility of public access to
confidential documents, though it cannot be assumed the Kentucky
Utilities court would grant access to those particular documents.8 7
In re Consumers, moreover, suggests public access should be the
norm, particularly in cases involving governmental regulation. 88 The
issue of access in proceedings involving federal agencies must be
approached in light of what information is necessary to "allow for
free and open debate of issues of great public concern."8 9 Access to
pretrial documents in these proceedings enhances important societal
policies and goals: Adjudicatory proceedings are better evaluated by
informed individuals; access increases public confidence in the
8 830 F.2d at 408.
8s Id. at 409. Whether discovery documents are relevant is an issue appropriately
determined through a motion for a protective order to prevent irrelevant discovery from
exchanging hands. Hence, when relevance is considered by the court, all discovery
submitted to the court is presumed relevant absent an earlier determination to the contrary.
For a discussion of the applicable standard for protective orders see infra, note 100.
86 See supra note 83.
87 The rationale in Kentucky Utilities lacks merit for several reasons. First, the court
cited no authority for concluding that discovery documents are not part of the court record.
Second, even though the court made sweeping statements regarding the accessibility of
discovery materials, the case is resolved solely on the issue of whether an individual can
intervene. Third, no court has yet to positively cite Kentucky Utilities, yet there is recent
conflicting authority. See Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227 (1st
Cir. 1992). Finally, this case represents another instance where the court ultimately
restricted access to discovery documents where there was a court order in effect, hence a
predetermined limit on the use of the discovery materials.




judicial system;' and when a regulatory agency is involved, the
public can inspect the workings of the particular agency and learn
what information the agency deems to be significant in enforcement
issues. In re Consumers disfavored disclosure merely because these
public interests did not outweigh the functional needs of the judicial
system.9" The court determined that the goals underlying the pretrial
discovery process - to maximize voluntary compliance and minimize
coercive court intrusions - override an intervenor's right of access
when a protective order is in effect.
The cases discussed above envision access to confidential
discovery materials to be limited in certain instances. Generally, this
determination is based on whether the right of access overrides the
private or judicial interests at stake. The common law right of access
and the first amendment argument, designed to increase public
access, have failed in particular cases.92
VI. THE CREATION OF A "DUAL-NATURE" DOCUMENT
Sections HI through V suggest that the same discovery materials
can be categorized as agency records and as court records. This
dichotomy between agency and court records parallels the dichotomy
of regulatory agencies as government entities and as civil litigants.
As government agencies, they follow their own rules and regulations,
but as litigants they are bound to follow court and civil procedure
rules.
The creation of a "dual-nature" document is consistent with
modern trends regarding the use of confidential business information.
Executive Order No. 126009" delineates the predisclosure notification
90 Id.
91 Id. Note that the court did not determine that the parties' private interests were
superior to the public interests. This distinction summarizes the court's rationale in
upholding the protective order, and demonstrates that In re Consumers is not contradictory
to this Comment's theory.
92 The common law right of access is questioned and even limited. See In re
Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352 (11th Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, 805
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). Moreover, there are several problems in applying the First
Amendment to a federal regulatory agency.
93 Exec. Order 12600, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (1987).
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procedures for confidential commercial information. Generally,
confidential commercial information given to the agency must not be
given to third parties without notice to the submitter.94 Section 8,
however, provides that notice need not be given when the
information has been published or has been officially made available
to the public. Since court records are generally available to the
public, court records held by government agencies as agency records
are available to the public, and a dual-nature document is created.
Case law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in accord
with Executive Order No. 12600: "A party may generally do what
it wants with material obtained through the discovery process, as
long as it wants to do something legal."'95 Furthermore, "[tlhe
Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] do not themselves limit the use of
discovered documents or information."96  Thus, an agency's
entitlement to disseminate discovery materials, based on the
material's status as court records, must coincide with the agency's
entitlement to disseminate the material as agency records once it is
determined that the documents are agency records.
The dual-nature of business information is not without opposition.
First, some agency regulations question the plausibility of defining
business documents, or any documents, as being both agency and
court records.97 Secondly, just as the possession of documents by an
agency does not transform them into agency records, 98 courts do not
lose control over court records merely because another party has
possession."
Although the theory of a dual-nature document is somewhat
troublesome, it serves as a catalyst for discussion into alternative
methods to distribute confidential information absent a court order
9 Id.
95 Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-684 (5th Cir. 1985).
Harris, 768 F.2d at 684.
97 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 145.0(b) which expressly excludes "court records" from the
definition of records.
98 See supra note 13.
9 See Valenti v. United States Dep't of Justice, 503 F. Supp. 230, 232 (E.D.La.
1980) Grand jury transcript in possession of U.S. attorney does not lose its status as a court
record and the court remains in control over the document. Id.
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restricting distribution.ro More importantly, by recognizing a dual-
nature in these discovery materials, courts create more flexibility to
refuse the release of documents when it foresees potential misuse of
the materials.
VIL SUGGESTED RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
There should be great concern over the seemingly limitless
disclosure requirements put forth in this Comment. Of greatest
concern should be the potential misuse of the business materials, a
concern that predates the legislative histories of the public access
laws guiding this discussion. 1 ' The legislature, being fully aware of
these concerns, found the public's needs superior yet placed limits to
exempt much of the commercial information from disclosure.'02 So
although the Freedom of Information laws protect documents
too A protective order that restricts the dissemination of discovery materials must meet
certain criteria mandated by the First Amendment. Initially, it must be determined by a
court whether a protective order in fact restrains expression and if so, the nature of that
restraint. In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir 1979). The court must then evaluate this
restriction in light of three criteria: (1) the harm posed by the dissemination must be
substantial and serious; (2) the protective order must be narrowly drawn; and (3) there must
be no alternative means of protecting the public interests which intrudes less directly. Id.
Each element must be considered in determining the propriety of the protective order. In
sum, this standard requires the party seeking the protective order to establish "good cause",
which requires a showing of particular and specific facts. Id.
101 See S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6279, 6280 (1973) which states
in part "Although the Act has been used successfully by public interest groups to vindicate
the public's right to know, not all litigants fit that category. Instead, the plaintiff may well
be a businessman using the [FOI] Act to gain information about a competitor's plans or
operations." Id.
102 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2418, 2427 (1966), discusses the
exemption of trade secrets and commercial or financial information currently found, in one
form or another, in all public access laws. The section provides, in pertinent part,
4. Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from any
person and privileged or confidential: This exemption would assure the confidentiality
of information obtained by the Government through questionnaires or through material
submitted and disclosures made . . . [it exempts such material if it would not
customarily be made public by the person from whom it was obtained by the
Government .... Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good faith
not to disclose documents or information which it receives, it should be able to honor
such obligations. Id.
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innocently and cooperatively turned over to federal agencies, the
exemptions are not absolute and absent an agreement between the
government and private party, disclosure may result.
Assuming a more liberal disclosure approach of business
information is uniformly accepted, the issue becomes what approach
will most efficiently lead the process. This discussion initially
branches down two avenues. First, in the case of discovery materials
available as court records, absent a protective order or other
stipulated agreement which limits the dissemination of the material,
the information should be absolutely available. There are no
exceptions to this rule because the parties had the opportunity to
prevent dissemination by obtaining a protective order or other
agreement before the issue arose. The standard for obtaining a
protective order contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that
discovered business records will not be superfluously withheld.
10 3
The more difficult avenue arises in the context of FOIA,'04 and
absent any further legislative assistance on the definition of
"records," courts will inevitably be bogged down in litigation relating
to this area. In spite of the increase in litigation and uncertainty
amongst federal agencies, an ad hoc determination is preferable as
opposed to dividing the world into records and nonrecords.' °5 An ad
hoc approach is more suitable because a court can consider the
merits of each particular case in light of the party who seeks
access."° Although public access laws do not require the document
requestor to provide a reason for requesting the documents, when
discovered business materials are sought, courts should look at the
requesting party to determine the worthiness of her claim since the
documents in question should be looked at as agency and court
103 See supra note 100.
104 Placing aside for a moment the argument that the availability of documents as
public court records creates public availability, and no court imposed restrictions apply with
respect to disseminating the information.
1os See Hall, supra note 9, at 426.
1o6 See supra note 100. As mentioned in the note discussing protective orders,
particular criteria need to be examined. Those criteria, and the policies embodying them,




records.10 7 This acts not only as a check on the otherwise "open
door" policy to court records, but decreases the likelihood of an
individual seeking confidential business information for her own
misuse.
Where these two avenues join, a balance is struck. The
unprotected court records in the hands of federal regulatory agencies
must be looked at in conjunction with the limits of a FOIA request.
This maintains the existing open access to government information
policy without mortally wounding the goal of encouraging open and
extensive discovery between the government, private business, and
the court system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The sensitive nature of business information in the hands of
federal regulatory agencies must be considered in light of the
public's right to obtain the information. The FOIA and the statutory
right of access provide an integrated means of permitting disclosure
while still protecting the information from abuses. Although the lack
of precision in defining agency and court records dampens the
likelihood of a clear-cut world in which documents are or are not
agency or court records, the result is nevertheless favorable. The
problems associated with defining the terms permit a court to
consider the "dual-nature" of the documents whereby courts actually
maintain more control over the materials.
In light of, or perhaps in spite of, the current issues raised by
access to confidential information cases, the overriding public
concerns must remain dominant, for "[j]ustice is better served in
sunshine than in darkness. 1 08 Open access to discovered business
materials permits supervision of the progress and integrity of
regulatory agencies, as well as private industry. It also allows
107 See supra, Section VI for a discussion of the dual-nature of discovered business
materials in the hands of regulatory agencies.
108 Fed. Trade Coms'n v. Standard Financial Mgmt, 830 F.2d at 412.
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individuals to remain informed as to what regulatory agencies deem
significant in bringing law suits and enforcement actions. Finally, by
permitting disclosure to be the norm, a strong tradition of public
access to court and agency records will continue.
Dennis B. Keene
